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MCNOLLGAST*
The expanded scope of government in this century has inevitably forced
the judiciary to devote ever more effort to the problem of determining legisla-
tive intent. When courts attempt to apply statutory language to real world
circumstances, the central question that arises is: What standards should
govern how courts interpret legislation? Political theorists and legal scholars
have proposed various standards of judicial review, the most important of
which have in common an emphasis on uncovering the "original intent" of
the parties to the legislation.I The search for original intent has led courts to
pursue progressively "deeper" readings of legislation, usually involving use
of the myriad legislative documents such as floor debates, conference com-
mittee reports, standing committee reports, and even committee hearing
testimony.2
The purpose of this paper is to use positive political theory to develop a
deeper insight into the concept of the original intent of legislation. Our start-
ing point is the analogy between legislation and contracts. 3 In the case of
legislation, parties to a statutory contract are the members of the legislative
coalition that enacted the statute, and the contract is an agreement over pub-
lic policy. In the tradition of the economic analysis of contract law, we argue
that the methods employed by the courts to interpret legislation should be
* The author is professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego; Morris
M. Doyle Centennial Professor of Public Policy at Stanford University; and Senior Fellow at the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
Helpful conversations with Robert Cooter, William Eskridge, John Ferejohn, Mitchell Polinsky,
and Daniel Rodriguez are gratefully acknowledged. The author also thanks Gabriella Montinola
for her helpful research assistance.
1. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 569-828 (1988).
2. Leading critics of the "deep" reading approach argue for a narrow "textualist" reading of
legislation. Another critical school uses a more passive approach, deferring to agencies in their
interpretations. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Con-
struction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (1988); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50
UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv.
621 (1990).
3. This observation has been pursued, albeit along a different path, in a seminal paper by Daniel
A. Farber. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests 75 MINN. L.
REV. 667 (1991). We adopt Farber's argument that the spirit of interpreting statutes, like contracts
and wills, should be to remain faithful to the drafters' intent. See also DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 88-115 (1990); Gil-
lian Hadfield, Incomplete Contracts and Statutes: Comment on Shepsle, "Congress Is a They Not an
'It,'" 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming June 1992).
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consistent across cases, should be faithful to the bargain struck by the con-
tracting parties, and should take into account the feedback effect of interpre-
tive principles on the efficiency of future negotiations and agreements.
These prescriptions present the courts with three difficult problems. The
first is to identify the coalition whose agreement is to be honored-the mem-
bers of Congress among whom a policy bargain was struck and codified into
legislation, plus (usually) the President. The second problem is to determine
the compromise that enabled the members of the coalition to pass the legisla-
tion. The third problem is to develop a method for solving the first two
problems that does not undermine the efficiency of the legislative process by
making legislation more costly and difficult. 4
Positive political theory provides a new foundation for the development
and evaluation of interpretive canons because it provides an objective method
for addressing these three problems. Indeed, we contend that canons should
be developed within an explicit, positive theory of the legislative process.
Thus, the principles of statutory interpretation that emerge from our ap-
proach are called positive canons.
Any normative theory of statutory interpretation that professes to be com-
patible with democratic principles of government must be grounded in an
appropriate positive model of politics-that is, it must accurately reflect the
politics of statutory construction. This statement may appear to be a radical
departure from current legal scholarship, but the departure is not as great as
it appears. Judgments about the legislative process are ubiquitous in legal
and judicial analysis of statutes (e.g., in discussions about how to weigh vari-
ous parts of legislative history). We contend that these judgments should be
made on the basis of an explicit theory. Instead, most arguments by legal
scholars and courts rely on an implicit theory of the legislative process that is
rarely explicated, supported, or validated. Our approach demonstrates how
the debates about statutory interpretation can be sharpened and even re-
solved by making explicit the theory of the legislative process from which
they are derived.
Positive political theory can make a significant contribution to overcoming
the difficulties encountered in filling in gaps in the legislative contract, in part
by focusing attention on several important features of the legislative process.
One is a sharper conceptualization of the notion of "statutory intent." Ac-
cording to the view taken in this paper, the intent of a statute is to codify the
agreement of the enacting coalition with respect to the policy adopted, in
part so that members of the enacting coalition can know more precisely the
nature of their agreement and in part to convey instructions to agencies and
4. The third problem encompasses the issue of conventionalism, i.e., that the conventions of
interpretation established by the courts should create the appropriate incentives for those affected
by them.
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courts. Statutes are most assuredly not embodiments of the objectives of any
particular person, but a compromise among numerous political actors. The
structure and process of legislative enactment allocate influence to the rele-
vant actors (including the President) and sometimes accord greater weight to
some over others, depending on the specific circumstances surrounding the
legislation.
A positive political theory approach suggests that the major lines of com-
promise result from bargains among veto players in the legislative process. 5
The preferences of veto players are most influential in determining policy
bargains, and, therefore, their preferences must be ascertained in order to
uncover the implicit agreement underlying the explicit statutory language.
A positive political theory approach also offers guidance in sorting out
meaningful or sincere evaluations of legislative language from strategic or
opportunistic posturing by legislators or the President. Positive theory pro-
vides an analytical framework for sorting through statements about a bill at
various stages of the bargaining process to separate statements that are likely
to reveal relevant information about the agreement of the enacting coalition
from more opportunistic attempts by members to gain personal advantage in
the way courts will interpret statutes after the fact.
We derive two general and several specific implications from our applica-
tion of positive political theory to the problem of building a normative frame-
work for statutory interpretation. First, positive political theory leads us to
look at the structure of the legislative process-as embodied in the Constitu-
tion and in House and Senate rules-to identify veto gates. Not all coalition
members are equally important in determining the content of legislation; pos-
itive political theory points to the members who control the various veto
gates as crucial to understanding legislative intent. Second, positive political
theory shows us that not all statements made by members of Congress and
the President are created equal. When talk is cheap---when members of Con-
gress or the President cannot be held accountable for their statements about
a bill by members of the coalition-its information content is not reliable.
These two general points imply several specific interpretive canons. The
first is that consequential statements and actions have priority over inconse-
quential ones. The second canon, following from the first, is that decisions
by legislators to reject language provide useful negative inferences about stat-
utes. The third canon is that the totality of the legislative history conveys
5. In order to become law, a bill must pass through several stages in the legislative process, some
prescribed by the Constitution and some by the official rules of each congressional chamber. This
creates a series of veto players. A veto player is an individual (such as a committee chair or the
President) or group of individuals (such as a committee of the House of Representatives) whose
consent is needed for legislation to pass. By failing to consent, that individual or group can pre-
vent-i.e., veto-the legislation.
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important information about whose preferences were most consequential in
shaping the coalitional agreement. That is, in the sequence of veto points
through which a statute must pass, some are likely to be much closer calls
than others, and at these stages the details of the coalitional agreement are
most profoundly shaped. The fourth canon is that because the President has
a constitutionally granted role in the legislative process, statutory interpreta-
tion must take the President's preferences into account and must accord
them considerable weight if the President possessed a credible veto threat
over the statute in question.
Our argument proceeds as follows. In Part I we discuss the role of an
appropriate positive theory of the legislative process, beginning by emphasiz-
ing the parallels between statutory interpretation and contract law: both rely
on the use of indicia to aid courts in interpreting texts. An important differ-
ence is that contract law has developed an elaborate, explicit theory of the
contracting process that limits the arbitrary use of indicia while statutory
interpretation has not. Part II describes the place of methods of statutory
interpretation in contemporary positive political theory, and derives several
implications for evaluating methods of statutory interpretation. Part III then
turns to a brief example concerning the problem of interpreting the 1970
amendments to the Clean Air Act, 6 as raised in Sierra Club v. Ruckleshaus.7
We conclude with a few remarks about the promise of a set of positive ca-
nons, including a discussion of its relevance for the debate about the new
textualism and the concept of agency deference.
I. THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
THE ROLE OF POSITIVE THEORY
Writing statutes shares many similarities with writing contracts. Both for-
malize bargains among actors with diverse and partially conflicting interests.
In the legislative process, as in the marketplace, actions happen only when
bargains are struck. Further, in both cases bargaining is costly.
The economic approach to the law of contracts evaluates legal regimes
according to their efficiency. Legal rules that increase the costs of negotiat-
ing contracts are rejected in favor of rules that facilitate contracting by re-
ducing transactions costs." Because it is costly to negotiate contracts that
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
7. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
8. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 212-47 (1988); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27-38 (2d ed. 1989); RICH-
ARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79-85 (3d ed. 1986); see also David Kreps, Corporate
Culture, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 90, 116-20, 124-31 (James Alt &
Kenneth Shepsle eds. 1990) (exploring the inevitability of unanticipated contingencies in the con-
tracting process and the value of developing a set of widely shared principles to resolve them).
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provide for every contingency, contracts typically do not cover every poten-
ti-11, -levant issue, thereby leaving gaps of unresolved issues. As Mitchell
Polinsky writes:
Contract law can be viewed as filling in these "gaps" in the contract-
attempting to reproduce what the parties would have agreed to if they
could have costlessly planned for the event initially. Since the parties
would have included contract terms that maximize their joint benefits net
of their joint costs-both parties can thereby be made better off .... 9
If, in resolving ambiguities or extending contracts to fill in gaps, courts use
principles of interpretation that allow them to read into contracts purposes
unrelated to the intent of the contracting parties, the courts diminish the
value of those agreements and all future agreements. Contracting parties will
discount the future value of their contracts by the probability a court will
establish a meaning to the agreement that does not reflect the bargain be-
tween its drafters. Such interpretive regimes are inefficient because the possi-
bility of court-created costs prevents some valuable agreements or forces the
contracting parties to undertake the expense of constructing contract terms
that anticipate and countermand anticipated court decisions.
In order to "reproduce what the parties would have agreed to if they could
have costlessly planned for the event initially" 10 courts rely on a wide range
of indicia, including evidence about the nature of the parties involved: their
preferences, intentions, and expectations at the time of the agreement, and
data about the relevant industries. Yet the use of indicia raises a. new prob-
lem-the possibility of arbitrariness in the face of multiple interpretations."
Because many different indicia can be used, a wide range of interpretations
can be rationalized. In these circumstances, what determines a court's
choice among the possible interpretations?
In order to induce the appropriate expectations among contracting parties,
the courts must use principles that, in general, serve the purposes of the bar-
gainers. The courts solved this problem by developing a complex and sophis-
ticated understanding of the contracting process based on the needs and
expectations of contracting parties and on the proper boundaries between
contracting and the rights of third parties. For the most part, the principles
for interpreting and enforcing contacts that emerged in the common law
have served to reduce uncertainties arising from ex post gap-filling decisions
9. POLINSKY, supra note 8, at 27.
10. Id.
11. This new problem differs from the circumstance in which the court substitutes its own judge-
ment or some well-defined social purpose for the intentions of the parties in that the latter does not
necessarily arise from ambiguity of interpretation, but from the court's use of its own preferences,
ideology, or social principles rather than principles associated with the problem of contracting and
bargaining.
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by the courts and have been based at least crudely on advancing economic
efficiency. Put simply, the development of a widely accepted theory of the
contracting process greatly reduced the potential for arbitrary use of
indicia. 12
The most important lesson from the history of the common law of con-
tracts is that courts greatly reduced the potential for arbitrariness by explic-
itly grounding precedents in a particular approach to the contract process
that encouraged efficient contracting. Exactly the same issues pertain to de-
veloping principles of statutory interpretation. Both legislation and contracts
emerge from compromise among conflicting interests. In both cases, writing
language to anticipate all future contingencies is infeasible because the future
is uncertain and, in any case, the transaction costs of perfectly crafted stat-
utes are prohibitive. As Richard Posner suggests:
The basic reason why statutes are so frequently ambiguous in application is
not that they are poorly drafted-though many are-and not that the legis-
lators failed to agree on just what they wanted to accomplish in the stat-
ute-though often they do fail-but that a statute necessarily is drafted in
advance of, and with imperfect appreciation for the problems that will be
encountered, in its application. 13
Viewed in the light of contract law, the purpose of canons of statutory
interpretation is to facilitate legislative agreements and thereby advance the
efficiency of the legislative process. However, the interpretive problem is
much more difficult for legislation than for contracts. First, while contracts
12. This important principle has long been a part of the jurisprudence underpinning contract
law, as illustrated by one of the most famous 19th century cases, Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.
Rep. 145 (K.B. 1854). In Hadley, the plaintiff sent a critical part for repair which was returned by
an unnecessarily circuitous route, imposing costly delays. Since the contract did not provide for
what should happen in the event of delay, the legal question of the case concerned who should be
liable for the losses incurred due to the delay.
In deciding this case, the court drew on a set of general principles that were to become the great
body of the common law tradition governing contracts. The court attempted to formulate a rule
which could be applied with general uniformity and less ambiguity to future similar cases. The
result was a liability rule focusing upon the foreseeability of harm likely to occur. The "court
decided that Baxendale was not liable for Hadley's lost profits because they were the result of
unusual circumstances that could not be reasonably supposed to have been contemplated by Bax-
endale. For Baxendale to be responsible for Hadley's lost profits, the court said, Hadley had to have
communicated his particular circumstances to Baxendale at the time that the contract was made."
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract:
The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. EcON. & ORGANIZATION 284, 284-85 (1991).
If the possibility of a mishap was foreseeable, it was potentially avoidable. This, in turn, implied
that the party who could avoid it at least cost-in this case, Hadley-was liable. Scholars in the law
and economics tradition have interpreted this case as providing for an efficient rule to govern issues
not explicitly covered by an agreement. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 8; POLINSKY, supra note 8, at
25-36.
13. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 811 (1983).
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typically reflect a bargain between two parties having conflicting interests,
legislation usually results from bargaining among numerous parties having a
wider diversity of purposes. Second, whereas contract law has a firm theoret-
ical foundation in the principles of economic efficiency, thus far statutory
interpretation has lacked a corresponding theory of the legislative process.
Consequently, the courts have not been able to agree on a systematic proce-
dure for inferring implicit legislative bargains from evidence about the legis-
lative process. This disagreement results in uncertainty about how laws will
be implemented and enforced, and so diminishes the value of legislation to
those who draft statutes and, ultimately, to citizens.
To illustrate how the absence of a coherent theory of the legislative process
causes arbitrariness in statutory interpretation by the courts, consider two
stylized theories of the legislative process. 14 One theory adopts an idealized
vision of the legislative process in which two contending parties with oppos-
ing policy objectives duel over an issue, presenting a clear choice between
two alternatives. Leaders of each side present an articulate and coherent
defense of their positions. At the end of the debate, the majority chooses
between the two sides. This theory implies that, after the fact, courts seeking
to interpret the legislation should look to utterances and expectations of the
side that won, especially its leaders, in order to guide their interpretation.
Unfortunately, this idealized view rarely characterizes the legislative process
for controversial legislation and, therefore, fails to address the problem of
arbitrariness in weighing the multiple views expressed. As Kenneth Shepsle
reminds us, "Congress is a they, not an it.''1 5
The second, slightly more complex theory takes a pragmatic view of the
legislative process as a compromise among three groups, none of which com-
mands a majority. First, ardent supporters advocate a policy change and de-
sign a legislative vehicle to implement it. Second, ardent opponents typically
prefer the status quo over any change. The fate of legislation hinges upon the
support of the third group, the moderates, whose interests lie between the
two extremes. Legislation emerges as a compromise between ardent support-
ers and moderates, achieved perhaps by scaling down the budget for a pro-
gram or by adding sections to the bill that expressly limit its scope.
Consequently, if statutory interpretation is guided by the principle of honor-
ing the spirit of the legislative bargain, it must not focus only on the prefer-
ences of the ardent supporters, but also on the accommodations that were
14. The following discussion draws heavily on Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, Posi-
tive Canons and Statutory Interpretation: Civil Rights Legislation, 1964-1991 (1991) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal).
15. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a They, Not an It: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L
REV. L. & EcON. (forthcoming June 1992).
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necessary to gain the support of the moderates.16
The differences between the idealized and pragmatic views of the legisla-
tive process are revealed in the debates over the interpretation of statutes
enacted in the 1970s to expand environmental, health, and safety regulation.
Two examples are the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA) 17 and the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA).Is In both cases, Congress cre-
ated a new regulatory agency with a broad and seemingly unqualified
regulatory mandate, yet Congress also provided both with cumbersome pro-
cedures that hindered each agency's ability to pursue its mandate. 19 Many
authors have seen inconsistencies between the broad statement of purpose
and the limitations on agency actions incorporated into these statutes. We
have argued elsewhere that these perceived "inconsistencies" represent inten-
tional limitations on policy outcomes that were part of the bargained agree-
ment by the enacting coalition.20
Because most complex legislation is the result of compromise, the tension
between the general mandate and the specific limitations must be resolved by
the courts. Their resolution therefore depends upon the extent to which the
courts rely on the portions written by the ardent supporters along with their
related remarks during the debate or on the portion written for the moder-
ates along with their related remarks during the debate. Yet how much
weight should the court place on each of these positions? Without a theory
of legislation, the choice may be made arbitrarily. To mitigate the problem
of arbitrariness, the courts need a theory of legislative process that can be
used to derive a set of positive canons for statutory interpretation.
Positive canons can have substantial practical importance. First, they will
reduce the degree of ex post arbitrariness in the process of statutory interpre-
tation-that is, the degree to which judges inadvertently substitute new prin-
16. As Posner suggests, where the lines of compromise are discernible, the judge's duty is to
follow them, to implement not the purposes of one group of legislators, but the compromise itself.
Posner, supra note 13, at 820. Posner later qualified his views. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 277-78 (1990).
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1988).
18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
19. For the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the enacting legislation established an offeror
process whereby the agency could not write its own proposed rules, but instead had to solicit pro-
posed rules from outside consultants. In the case of O.S.H. Administration, the agency could not
set its own agenda with respect to regulatory targets, but rather had to rely on a second agency, the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), to set its agenda. Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. &
ORGANIZATION 243, 267-68 (1987); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure, in CAN
THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN?, 267, 296-97, 301 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1989).
For additional cases involving regulation of chemicals by the Environmental Protection Agency, see
Matthew D. McCubbins & Talbot Page, A Theory of Congressional Delegation, in CONGRESS:
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 409, 416-20 (Matthew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
20. McCubbins et al., supra note 19, at 414-20.
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ciples for those agreed upon by the enacting coalition. Second, they will
provide a clear set of expectations to legislators, giving them greater confi-
dence that their bargains, once struck, will remain stuck. The possibility that
courts will redefine bargains ex post hinders the ability of legislators to arrive
at agreements. Third, positive canons shed light on the debate over other
interpretative approaches such as textualism and agency deference, and
thereby on the controversies surrounding the role of the courts in specific
policy areas such as civil rights and environmental protection.
The following presents a theory of the legislative process and derives from
it a set of normative principles of statutory interpretation-a set of positive
canons. We argue that for both positive and normative reasons, a theory of
statutory interpretation should take into account the effects of an interpretive
method on the costs and stability of the legislative process. Interpretive
methods affect legislative effectiveness through their effect on the frequency
and difficulty of legislative action, and on the extent to which the legislative
process is free of unproductive strategic behavior by individual political ac-
tors to influence how statutes are interpreted.
By applying the contemporary positive political theory of the U.S. govern-
ment, several conclusions can be reached about the interpretive canons that
are likely to emerge from the political system that, as a normative matter,
courts should adopt if they seek to be faithful to the democratic theory of the
U.S. Constitution. A valid theory of statutory interpretation as expressed in
a set of positive canons must focus on the views, expectations, and utterances
of the marginal supporters of legislation. In the simple illustration discussed
above, this was the moderates. In what follows, we provide a new approach
that reveals the relevant political actor in a wide variety of circumstances.
While often this is a member of Congress-e.g., the median member of one of
the houses, or the marginal member on a presidential veto override-some-
times it is the President. A valid theory of statutory interpretation must,
therefore, take into account the preferences of the President.
II. POSITIVE THEORY AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Positive political theory has been concerned with two central issues: col-
lective action and delegation. 2' The collective action problem concerns how
governing institutions, populated by representatives elected under differing
electoral structures and holding differing policy objectives, make durable bar-
gains about public policy. A continuing theme of much of the theoretical
literature on collective action has been the instability of collective choice in
21. These issues are reviewed in D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATTHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE
LOGIC OF DELEGATION: CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 22-27
(1991).
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majority rule institutions such as legislatures. 22 Durability of legislative
agreements is made all the more difficult in American politics by a constitu-
tional structure that requires enacting coalitions to encompass majorities in
both houses of Congress and the White House; such coalitions rarely last
very long. The delegation problem concerns how, once a bargain has been
struck by a legislative coalition, elected officials ensure that their policy bar-
gains are carried out by the armies of bureaucrats who make day-to-day deci-
sions to implement policies and who presumably have their own policy
agendas.
Legislation plays an important role in solutions to both problems. First,
with respect to the collective action problem, statutes define and record the
details of the bargain reached among majorities in the House and Senate
plus, most often, the President. In this sense, legislation is the instrument of
collective action. Second, because of the multiplicity of veto gates that must
be overcome to enact new legislation-agreement must be reached among
House and Senate committees, the majority party leadership in both cham-
bers, and majorities in both chambers, plus the President-it is difficult to
introduce changes willy-nilly to previous legislative bargains that have been
enacted into law. Thus, enactment gives some measure of durability to the
policy bargain reached by the members of the enacting coalition. Third, with
respect to the delegation problem, statutes also are instructions to bureau-
crats concerning policy. 23
For statutes to serve the purposes desired by the enacting coalition, the
language of legislation must serve as a reasonably reliable predictor of policy
outcomes. Members of the enacting coalition must have confidence that,
although they have different policy preferences, they generally agree on what
the statute means and what policy outcomes will be derived from that mean-
ing. Otherwise, statutes cannot serve the purpose of embodying their solu-
tion to the collective action problem.
Unfortunately, statutory language can only rarely be precise in conveying
either policy bargains or instructions to agencies. Nature has a nasty habit of
creating situations in which the applicability of a statute is unclear. But even
22. See, e.g., David Baron & John Ferejohn, Bargaining in Legislatures. 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
1181, 1199-1201 (1989); Shepsle, supra note 15; Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Institu-
tional Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 85, 100-102 (1987).
23. Statutes are, of course, a double-edged sword: each party to the agreement knows a priori
that some aspects of the policy bargain may not work out as anticipated; they further recognize that
all parties to the original bargain may not agree to rewriting the bargain to compensate for such
failures. In that case, faulty bargains cannot be corrected ex post. See generally, Brian A. Marks, A
Model of Judicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City College v. Bell, (Nov. 1988)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Georgetown Law Journal); Matthew D. McCubbins et
al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Con-
trol of Agencies; 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989).
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if nature were not unkind, the meaning of statutes would still be problematic
because language is inherently imprecise and because rational political ac-
tors, having many demands on their time, would never devote the effort nec-
essary to minimize the indeterminacy of statutory language. Consequently,
the principles used to interpret unclear statutory provisions play an impor-
tant role in determining the course of public policy.
In writing a statute, the enacting coalition can be regarded as facing a form
of constrained optimization problem. The coalition and the staff who work
for its members allocate a valuable resource-their time and effort-to a va-
riety of activities that will create a policy. One is negotiating what the policy
will be, which requires compromising their differences. Another is writing
statutory language for each provision in the statute, including the provisions
governing the structure and process of the implementing bureaucracy and
the process of judicial review of the agency's decisions. Still another activity
available to them is to agree on the methods to be used in interpreting ambig-
uous or contradictory provisions in the statute. Finally, given the principles
of interpretation that the coalition adopts, or that its members anticipate the
courts will use, members of the coalition can undertake activities that will
influence the interpretation that agencies and courts will adopt.
The solution to this optimization problem is unlikely to be a statute that is
worded with perfect clarity, nor is it likely to be a relatively vague statute
combined with a crystal clear method of interpretation. Here a parallel can
be drawn between the legislative process and the negotiation of private con-
tracts. In neither case will the parties to an agreement find it worthwhile to
anticipate every conceivable eventuality in reaching a written agreement. In-
deed, in both cases the principles of interpretation adopted by the courts will
affect the effort devoted to details in the written agreement. If the parties to
an agreement regard the interpretive methods of the court as likely to pro-
duce a result that is a reasonable compromise of their interests-a compro-
mise that reflects the basic compromises struck in the original agreement-
they need not devote as much effort to fashioning the original agreement.
Interpretive principles, then, are an integral part of the coalitional agree-
ment about a statute, either explicitly in the statute (or in other statutes
about the role of agencies and courts in carrying out the statute) or implicitly
through reliance on continued application of interpretive principles pro-
pounded by the courts. Explicit and implicit understandings about interpre-
tive principles affect the allocation of effort to other parts of the legislative
process, and hence affect the total cost of a legislative agreement. Given this
background, one can readily identify several aspects of interpretive methods
that members of the enacting coalition will regard as important.
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A. DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF INTERPRETIVE CANONS
Much like the canons of contract law, canons of statutory interpretation
should decrease rather than increase the costs bargainers face in trying to
reach an agreement and should expand rather than reduce the range of issues
over which agreements can be reached. If the legislative process is more
efficient and if conflicting factions can reach accord on a broader range of
issue, political leaders will be able to achieve their objectives more effectively.
Interpretative canons, we argue, should aid the legislative process, making it
less costly for policy bargains to be struck. Desirable properties of interpre-
tive canons, then, are as follows.
1. Consistency
The enacting coalition will place greater value on a method of statutory
interpretation that produces the same result when the objective circum-
stances are the same. Just as legislators value the stability in legislative out-
comes that flows from the legislature's internal structure and procedures,
legislators do not want judicial interpretation of statutes to introduce ran-
domness and unpredictability into policy outcomes. If legislators cannot rely
on the stability of the approach to interpretation adopted by the courts, their
recourse is greater specificity in both the substance of legislation and statu-
tory guidance about interpretation. Not only is greater specificity costly in
its own right, but it also increases the likelihood that more substantive legis-
lation will be required in the future when circumstances arise that were not
anticipated in the original statute. Because future legislation is costly and its
details unpredictable, the coalition will prefer an interpretive standard that
extends a statute in a manner that is consistent with the coalition's agree-
ment, but this is only possible if the courts' method of interpretation is con-
sistent. Consistency also enables legislative coalitions to focus their efforts
toward creating substantive policy and influencing interpretive principles on
only those cases in which the coalition believes that the courts' interpretation
is unacceptable.
2. Opportunistic Potential
The disintegration of legislative bargains comes from two sources. First,
enacting coalitions are composed of individuals with diverse and conflicting
values and objectives. To the extent that statutes can be regarded as expres-
sing policy preferences, they embody the values and objectives arising from
compromise among coalition members. Most likely, no member of the coali-
tion has been accommodated fully by the ultimate statutory bargain. Conse-
quently, each member of the coalition has an incentive to try to change
unilaterally the coalitional agreement. Opportunism refers to individual ac-
tions to deflect the effect of the agreement to one's advantage. In crafting
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legislation, each legislator may wish to behave opportunistically, but each
realizes that, in general, a policy that is manipulable by opportunistic behav-
ior is less valuable. Policy will be less predictable, and hence less valuable to
the coalition as a whole, and each member will have to devote effort to be-
having opportunistically, if only to prevent others from undertaking success-
ful opportunistic actions. Thus, the enacting coalition will prefer methods of
statutory interpretation that are least susceptible to opportunistic actions by
individual members of the coalition.
Second, opportunistic behavior by others involved in the policy process,
such as implementing agencies and the courts, can change the policy bargain
struck by the enacting coalition. For example, suppose that courts, in pur-
suit of maximizing their own discretion in influencing policy outcomes, adopt
a set of interpretive canons that are internally inconsistent and that selec-
tively can be used to justify almost any interpretation of a statute. The effect
would be to undermine the ability of the enacting coalition to make policy, so
that it would be forced to pursue the complex strategy of writing more care-
fully specified legislation and rules for interpreting it. The result in legisla-
tion would inevitably be more costly, narrower, and would require more
frequent statutes. The end result would be less desirable for both the enact-
ing coalition and the courts. The former would be able to accomplish fewer
legislative objectives, but would incur more costs of legislation, and the latter
would end up with less discretion than if it adopted interpretive canons that
the enacting coalition found more acceptable.
In similar fashion, the enacting coalition is not likely to want to give com-
plete discretion to the implementing agency to interpret the scope of its man-
date, for to do so creates the possibility that the agency will behave
opportunistically, or that a member of the enacting coalition will be able
unduly to influence the agency's interpretation. For example, the President
or the chairs of congressional oversight committees might have so much
more influence over the agency than other members of the coalition that the
latter would want to avoid creating a broad scope of agency discretion. If
courts adopt the principle that agency interpretations of statutes should be
accorded great deference, the result is narrower legislation that is less dura-
ble and more costly to fashion.
Some might argue that consistency is the only necessary condition to im-
pose on interpretive canons. Whatever canons the courts adopt, as long as
they are consistently applied, will create an incentive for members of the
enacting coalition to undertake activities and to generate information that
would influence the statutory interpretation resulting from this canon. But,
if these canons, however consistently applied, do not uphold the legislative
bargain struck among members of the enacting coalition-if they bias out-
comes in favor of certain coalition members, for example-then, in anticipat-
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ing the application of these canons by the courts, members of the enacting
coalition will reduce the number, scope, and duration of the bargains into
which they will enter. Fewer public policies will be enacted and those that
are enacted will be amended more frequently.
B. DEVELOPING POSITIVE CANONS
There is probably little disagreement over the desirability of the two
properties for statutory interpretation just proposed. Properties similar in
intent to these have been proposed previously.24 The problem in developing
canons that satisfy these properties, of course, is in determining the method
for ascertaining the dimensions of the legislative bargain. Who were the key
actors in the legislative process, and what was the bargain that they struck?
This is precisely where positive political theory-as applied to the legislative
process--can help to develop canons of statutory interpretation.
We have argued that the policy bargain among members of the enacting
coalition consists of both an explicit statement of this agreement (e.g., in the
text of the resulting statute) and implicit agreements over ambiguous provi-
sions and how the explicit bargain will be applied to unforeseen circum-
stances. Therefore, statutory interpretation that goes beyond strict
textualism and constrains the discretion of both the courts and the imple-
menting agency requires a method of constructing the implicit bargains of
the coalition. The question to be answered by an interpretive method, then,
is what agreement the coalition thought it might be making that is not ex-
plicit in the language of the statute. Because the coalition's agreements rep-
resent a compromise among its members, the ascertainment of an implied
agreement rests on understanding what interests were compromised-that is,
who actually can be regarded as a member of the enacting coalition.
There are, then, two puzzles that we must resolve in order to create inter-
pretive canons that satisfy the properties of consistency and upholding legis-
lative bargains. The first is how to identify the members of the enacting
coalition, among whom the bargain was struck and whose preferences most
affected the dimensions of the bargain. Second, within the enacting coalition,
how do we identify the preferences of those who mattered most in locating
the deal that was finally struck? We address these puzzles in turn.
1. Identifying the Enacting Coalition
Though there have been some attempts recently to incorporate the Presi-
dent into the methods by which courts interpret statutes,25 virtually all of the
24. See ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 571-639.
25. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Whose Legislation Is It Anyway? Statutory Interpretations and
Political Advantage, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. (forthcoming June 1992) (discussing presidential
signing statements).
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evidence cited in court decisions regarding "legislative intent" focuses on
congressional activities. Because of this we first discuss the role of the Presi-
dent in legislative bargains. Positive political theory, as a first step, leads
inexorably to the conclusion that, in the U.S. federal system, the President
exercises considerable influence over legislation and is, therefore, a member
of most enacting coalitions.
The Constitution confers upon the President two important powers: the
veto 26 and the power to propose international agreements. 27 With regard to
the veto, unless a statute is supported by an overwhelming majority, the
threat of veto can constitute an important check on the content of legislation.
Consequently, if an interpretive method is based upon an attempt to use non-
statutory information to uncover implicit agreements, then information
about the preferences of the President is potentially as important as informa-
tion about the preferences of the legislators who supported the bill. We have
argued that statutory interpretation should be consistent and should support
the legislative bargain. In this case, a statutory interpretation is invalid if the
explicit statement of that interpretation would have caused the President to
veto the bill without Congress being able to override the veto.
The role of the President in legislation is further enhanced by numerous
statutory requirements that the President or executive agencies submit legis-
lative proposals to Congress. For example, the President is frequently asked
to study (or to appoint a blue-ribbon committee to study) an area of policy
and to make legislative proposals on the basis of the study. 28 Legislation also
requires the President to submit annual budget requests for virtually all exec-
utive and independent agencies. 2
9
The authority to draft legislative proposals does not necessarily give the
President any additional influence over the policy bargaining process. In-
deed, Congress can and quite often does amend or reject presidential propos-
als.30 But when presidential proposals are enacted with little change, the
President's preferences are likely to have been influential. Typically, presi-
dential legislative proposals are accompanied by reports or sometimes even
presidential addresses explaining the intentions of the legislation. When the
President's proposal is enacted as proposed, there is no valid basis for accord-
ing the President's accompanying explanatory material less weight than is
accorded to the reports of the committees that considered the bill. Indeed,
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.2.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2. With regard to treaty powers, because treaties cannot be nego-
tiated by Congress-though they can of course be amended or rejected by the Senate-interpreta-
tions of treaty obligations must start with the President's intent.
28. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2210(1) (1988) (establishing Presidential Commission on Catastrophic
Nuclear Accidents).
29. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (1988).
30. See generally KIEWIET & McCuBBINS, supra note 21.
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
because committees can vitiate the President's explanatory text by making
modest changes in the language of a bill, presidential explanatory texts
should be accorded great weight when the language proposed by the Presi-
dent is ultimately enacted.
The upshot of this discussion is that interpretive methods that ignore the
role played by the President are unacceptable on both positive and normative
grounds. As a matter of positive theory, principles of statutory interpreta-
tion that ignore the veto power held by the President will lead the President
to veto bills that the President might find acceptable under alternative inter-
pretive regimes. Hence, Congress will happily introduce interpretive guide-
lines that accord the President weight in order not to have such statutes
vetoed. As a matter of normative theory, if canons of statutory interpreta-
tion are to be evaluated on the basis of the degree to which they faithfully
execute the theory of governance embodied in the Constitution, interpreta-
tions that ignore the President are unacceptable. Such canons, if pursued,
would have the effect of stripping the President of both constitutional powers
and statutory responsibilities enacted by Congress itself.
It is also a relatively straightforward exercise to find those who were ex-
cluded from the enacting coalition. Members of Congress who voted against
the legislation in key votes, who spoke against the legislation in committee
and floor debates, and who offered unsuccessful amendments to kill or gut
the legislation should be regarded as being outside of the enacting coalition.
Their preferences should be accorded no weight in any interpretive
method. 31 Further, if the President vetoed the legislation, and both houses
voted to override his veto, then the President's preferences can be accorded
no weight.
Determining which members of the enacting coalition in the legislature
should be accorded weight in the process of interpreting statutes is not as
easy as it was for the President or for stated opponents of the legislation. A
legislative compromise almost always produces a result that is more
favorable to some of its supporters than to others. Positive political theory
provides considerable insight into whose policy preferences are likely to have
been accorded the most weight in forging the compromise. These insights
can be derived from the neoinstitutionalist analysis of how the legislative pro-
cess accords rights and powers to members of the enacting coalition.
The single most important feature of the legislative process is that, to suc-
ceed, a bill must survive a gauntlet of veto gates in both the House and Sen-
ate, each of which is guarded by members of the relevant chamber who were
chosen by their peers to supervise that particular gate. In each house of Con-
31. Of course, amendments rejected by the enacting coalition may yield further evidence about
the dimensions of the bargain struck among the supporters of the legislation.
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gress, a subcommittee and a full committee have "gatekeeping" rights in that
a bill normally cannot be considered by the entire legislative body until it has
been approved in committee. Then, legislation must be given a position on
the legislative calendar and often must secure a special rule restricting debate
or amendments (or both) from the Rules Committee, which is itself con-
trolled by the party leadership of the majority party. Then, legislation must
be approved by majorities in each branch. Differences in the legislation
passed by the two houses must then be resolved. Such resolution is often
accomplished through a conference committee, typically comprised of mem-
bers of the committees in each house that drafted the bill. Finally, the com-
promise reached by a majority of the conferees from each branch must be
approved without amendment by majorities in both houses and signed by the
President. The most useful conceptualization of the enacting coalition is the
union of all of the actors who approved the legislation at each of the veto
points.
2. Identifying the Enacting Coalition Members
Positive political theory provides predictions about the relative power of
each of the sequential majorities plus the President in influencing the final
legislative outcome. The influence of a member of the enacting coalition de-
pends on three things: the ability of the member to control the agenda of the
legislature, the relative amount of information about proposed alternatives
and the preferences of others possessed by the member, and the details of the
differences in policy objectives among members. In general, two bills that
follow precisely the same legislative path will not be equally influenced by
each member of the enacting coalition even if their enacting coalitions are
identical.
The preceding conclusion can be illustrated by example. For ease of expo-
sition, consider the counterfactual case in which the legislature is unicameral,
with a single committee and no subcommittees. To mimic the case in which
a conference committee is composed of members of the originating commit-
tees in each house, assume that the committee has the power to make a legis-
lative proposal that must be accepted or rejected without amendment by both
a majority of the full legislative body and by the President. 32 (This assump-
tion will be relaxed shortly to illustrate the importance of the power to con-
trol the alternatives considered in the full legislature.) In our examples, the
policy choice will be represented as picking a point along a line. In each
case, the following notation will be used:
32. We also assume, for simplicity, that each decision is a single-shot game. For extensions of
this model, see D. Roderick Kiewiet & Matthew D. McCubbins, Presidential Influence on Congres-
sional Appropriations Decisions, 32 AM. J. POL. Sci. 713, 713-36 (1988).
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Q: the status quo policy that will remain in effect if a bill is not
passed;
P: the policy preferred by the President;
P+: the policy that the President regards as equally desirable to the
status quo;
C: the policy preferred by the committee (in our examples, for ease of
exposition, the committee is given as a single member);
C+: the policy regarded by the committee as equally desirable to the
status quo;
M: the most desirable policy in the view of the median voter in the
legislature;
M+: the policy the median legislator regards as equally desirable to the
status quo;
T: the optimal policy for the legislator whose vote will determine
whether a presidential veto is overridden;
T: the policy that the pivotal member on the override vote regards as
equally desirable to the status quo.
The key assumption in our example is that each player's valuation of a policy
choice decreases the greater the distance between that policy choice and the
player's most preferred policy. It follows that no member will vote for a
proposal that is further from the most preferred policy than the status quo.
Hence, the President will veto a bill that is not somewhere between Q and
P ; the full legislature (represented by the median voter) will reject a propo-
sal that is not between Q and M ; the committee will propose only bills
between Q and C (or no bill at all); and the pivotal voter on an override will
vote to override a veto only if the bill is between Q and T*.
Our first examples are shown in Figure 1, where Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 depict
four different configurations of preferences. In Case 1, the President's veto
threat is credible because the optimal policies from the perspectives of both
the committee and the median member of the legislature are regarded by the
President as less desirable than the status quo. Consequently, if the commit-
tee proposes, and the legislature adopts, any policy to the right of point T*,
the President will veto the bill and the pivotal legislator will vote to sustain
the veto. Hence, the committee's best strategy is to propose a bill slightly to
the left of T* because a presidential veto of such a bill would be overridden.
Such a proposal will make all key legislators better off than if the status quo
were retained and, from the perspective of the committee, is the best legisla-
tive outcome (i.e., it is the one closest to C) that can be enacted. In this case,
the preferences of the President and the veto override player are crucial.
In Case 2, the median legislator, the President, and the committee all have
quite similar preferences. In this case, the veto threat is not credible because
the President prefers both C and M to the status quo. Consequently, the
preferences of the pivotal voter on a veto override are irrelevant. The com-
[Vol. 80:705
1992] LEGISLATIVE BARGAINS IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 723
FIGURE 1
case i
Q P T P+ T+ M C
Q C P M P+
o M P M+ C
Q T P T+ P+ M C
mittee will simply propose its best policy, C, because C is preferred by both
the median legislator and the President and so both will assent to it. In this
case the determining preferences are those of the committee.
Case 3 illustrates a circumstance in which the committee is an "outlier": it
prefers a policy that is much further from the status quo than either the
President or the median legislator is willing to accept. In this particular case,
the most difficult task facing the committee is placating the median member
of the legislature, rather than the President. Hence, the committee must pro-
pose legislation slightly to the left of M in order to receive majority support
in the legislature and avoid a veto. In this case, the determining preferences
belong to the median legislator and the committee, and the bill can be seen as
a compromise between those two.
Case 4 illustrates the situation in which the threat of a veto override is the
most important force influencing people. Any bill that the President is will-
ing to veto (i.e., all policies to the right of P+) will be sustained (as P+ is to
the right of T+). Hence, the committee's job is to propose a bill that is the
best deal it can cut with the President without causing a veto. Thus, the
committee must propose a policy slightly to the left of P-.
Now suppose that the committee cannot make a take-it-or-leave-it propo-
sal to the legislature, but it can decide whether legislation will be considered.
Once a bill is proposed, the median member of the legislature will immedi-
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ble to M. In Case 1, the rule change that allows amendment makes no
difference. The best that the median member can do is to propose a bill that
the President will veto but that will be enacted on override, which is still T + .
In Case 2, the rule change is consequential, for the median legislator now will
amend the committee proposal, C, to M, which will then pass and be signed
by the President. Likewise, in Case 3, the outcome will be M instead of M .
But in Case 4, the presidential veto threat is again the most powerful influ-
ence, and the legislature will adopt P*.
The purpose of these examples is to illustrate that the ultimate legislative
bargain depends on the circumstances: the preferences of each member of
the enacting coalition, the position of the status quo, and the rules followed
by the legislature in considering a bill. Because the legislature makes its own
decisions about the sequence of veto gates, amendment agendas and commit-
tee assignments, these rules must be taken into account in evaluating the
influence of each actor in the legislative process. In addition, these rules do
affect outcomes and accordingly play an important role in a positive theory
of statutory interpretation.
In general we can derive two important implications concerning the devel-
opment of interpretive canons. First, the structure and process of legislative
decisionmaking determines who is to play key roles in the legislative bargain
over any policy issue. Indeed, legislative structure and process are chosen to
facilitate collective action by, in large part, establishing a division of labor
and a system of checks and balances that defines the key decisionmaking
roles on each policy issue. While vocal or ardent supporters of legislative
proposals are important in motivating people to change policy, they rarely
hold key veto gates in the legislative process, and thus they are rarely pivotal
in the policy bargain. The division of authority chosen by members of Con-
gress and prescribed by the Constitution, together with the preferences of the
players at each stage of the legislative process, determines which players are
pivotal for any decision, and it is the preferences of these pivotal players that
a method of statutory interpretation must discover.
In many cases the President will be pivotal. Presidents frequently inform
legislators of their preferences by sending messages to Congress. In these
messages the President often indicates support for certain provisions and op-
position to others, including in many instances a veto threat for aspects the
President opposes. If veto threats affect congressional action, such as by
causing members of Congress to modify or delete certain portions of a bill,
then the President's veto threat is, in fact, influential. Consequently, statu-
tory interpretations should accord the President's preferences greater weight
when the veto threat is binding on the actions of Congress.
Under most circumstances the pivotal players in the legislative bargain
will occupy veto gates in Congress. In many instances the most important
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veto gates are the House and Senate committees charged with revising policy
and writing legislation. The members of these committees decide the fate of
most bills in Congress. And frequently, the members of committees have
substantial control over the agenda under which legislation is considered by
the rest of the legislature. At other times, the pivotal actors might sit on the
Rules Committee, or might occupy leadership positions in the House or Sen-
ate, such as the Majority Leader in the Senate or the Speaker of the House.
Party leaders often have some measure of control over the legislative agenda,
as well as control of important veto gates. In still other cases (though we do
not model such cases here) the pivotal decision might be made in a caucus of
the majority party in either the House or Senate.
The second implication from the above analysis is that rules and proce-
dures matter a great deal in determining the legislative bargain. When the
House is considering legislation, for example, and the authors of the legisla-
tion on the House committee have been granted control over the agenda
through restrictive rules (such as a closed rule in which no amendments to
the committee's bill are allowed), then it is likely that the committee mem-
bers were pivotal in passing the legislation. On the other hand, if the com-
mittee's proposal is considered under an open rule, which allows
amendments to be offered against the committee's proposal, then it is likely
to be representatives of floor majorities, perhaps the leadership of the major-
ity party, that is pivotal in the policy bargain.
3. Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Identifying the Preferences of
Pivotal Coalition Members
How is a court to proceed in implementing an interpretive standard that
plausibly represents the agreement of the enacting coalition? This entails the
discovery of the preferences of the pivotal members of the enacting coalition.
The hazard associated with eliciting preferences, however, is that the legisla-
tive process is rife with opportunities for strategic behavior. In the first
place, every stage in the legislative process is susceptible to manipulation by
strategic actors. Amendments can be offered both in committee and on the
floor that are designed not to change the proposed policy, but to kill it. Vot-
ing on amendments can also be strategic, intended to burden a bill with ob-
jectionable amendments so that those who originally favored the bill end up
rejecting it. Additionally, extreme statements concerning the intent of the
legislation will be placed in the record in order to move public opinion and to
put pressure on other members to change their position.
We have emphasized the need for an interpretive regime to produce results
that are consistent, predictable, and supportive of the bargains struck by
members of the enacting legislative coalition. It follows that interpretations
of a statute derived from proposed amendments and alternatives that were
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rejected at various veto gates cannot become part of a valid statutory
interpretation.
A second form of strategic behavior stems from the delegation problem as
members of Congress and the President look ahead to interpretations of the
statute by courts, they may act opportunistically in an attempt to influence
judicial interpretation.
Despite the perils to the legislative process, we do observe that enacting
coalitions form and that legislation is passed. Our positive analysis of the
legislative process points out that, at every stage in legislative bargaining,
members of Congress and the President have an incentive to try to twist the
bargain in their own favor through strategic behavior. But individual state-
ments, either by the President, lobbyists, or by members of Congress, either
in hearings, debates, minority reports or statements into the record, do not
represent the collective agreement and should be accorded no weight in the
interpretation of the statute.
Positive political theory does suggest that some participants in the legisla-
tive process, at particular stages in the negotiations, will have incentives to
act sincerely, rather than strategically, in either of the senses we have dis-
cussed. Both the President (at least in the first term) and members of Con-
gress face an electoral incentive, which imposes costs for pursuing complex,
strategic behaviors. Thus, for example, the President often has an incentive
to convey veto threats accurately.
Further, in putting together policy bargains, the authority to strike agree-
ments, to make logrolls, and to bring together diverse interests into a legisla-
tive compromise is delegated by majorities in the House and Senate (most
often the majority parties in those chambers) to an agent. Sometimes the
chosen agent is the President or an executive department or agency, but most
often the agents are the committees of the House and Senate. In delegating
to these agents, members of Congress know that their agents are likely to use
their delegated authority to manipulate the policy bargain in their own inter-
est. Consequently, these delegations are never unconstrained or unmanaged.
The ultimate authority to make decisions is always retained by majorities in
each house, and perhaps most important, strategic behavior by agents is
sanctioned (policies are rejected, delegated authority is revoked, and so
forth). Thus, positive political theory suggests that the findings, interpreta-
tions, and proposals of agents of the majority, as reported to the House and
Senate for review, are meaningful, and statements by these agents that are
not contradicted or rejected at some later stage are implicitly approved by
their parent chambers when the bill itself is approved.
But when members of Congress or the President do not face disincentives
to act strategically, positive political theory suggests they probably will do so.
For example, presidential signing statements are not checked by members of
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the legislative coalition. There is no way to overturn or amend a presidential
signing statement. Even though members of Congress could reach an agree-
ment beforehand with the President on the contents of a signing statement,
because there is no way for the President to commit to carry out the agree-
ment, the potential for unchecked opportunistic behavior by the President is
great. We therefore expect Presidents to act strategically in formulating
signing statements, so that no weight should be accorded to them.
Likewise, members of Congress who have not been designated as agents of
the majority on a particular issue cannot easily be held accountable by the
majority for their actions and statements on that issue. Their incentives to
act strategically will therefore run unchecked. Again, our approach suggests
that their statements should be discounted. Thus, individual and minority
statements and reports should carry no weight in statutory interpretation.
Positive political theory leads us to understand that talk is cheap; only when
the majority is in a position to sanction such talk should it be considered
relevant for statutory interpretation, and then only to the extent that it
(statements, reports) is not directly contradicted by action (i.e., by voting
behavior).
III. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
In this section, we apply our approach to several problems of interpreta-
tion arising from the 1970 and 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
33
This topic is useful in two respects. First, it has been the subject of consider-
able attention by legal scholars. 34 Second, several important questions of in-
terpretation have been brought to the courts.
We focus on three interpretations of the Clean Air Act. First, we show
that some legal scholars use the same logic as our approach, namely, that the
ardent supporters of the legislation must compromise their pure vision with
moderates in order to ensure passage. Second, we critique those scholars
who ignore the first lesson. In particular, the legislator who writes an act
does not necessarily control its contents. The need to gain the support of a
majority coalition implies that the author must faithfully record the bargain
cementing the coalition. This, in turn, implies that the author's preferences
and vision may be an inaccurate guide to the meaning of the compromise
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988).
34. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR
(1981); CHARLES 0. JONES, CLEAN AIR: THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF POLLUTION CONTROL
(1975); R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(1983); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 313 (1985).
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legislation. 35 Third, we focus our attention on one aspect of the 1970 amend-
ments, that of the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) of air quality
in "pristine" areas (i.e., regions of the country with air quality above the
minimum standards set by the Act). We argue that Judge Pratt's interpreta-
tion of these amendments in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus 36 fails to satisfy our
positive canons. Judge Pratt's reliance on indicia favoring the view of the
ardent supporters over the moderates undid the compromise that allowed the
legislation to be passed in the first place.
A. "CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR" REVISITED
The logic of our central theoretical conclusion-the need for ardent sup-
porters to secure the support of pivotal legislators-has long been part of the
analysis of legislation, even if it has not been as explicit or as theoretical as in
our approach. An important work in this tradition is Bruce Ackerman and
William Hassler's study of the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, per-
haps the most famous work on environmental legislation. 37 One of their cen-
tral points about the politics of the 1977 amendments concerns the need of
the ardent environmentalists in Congress to gain enough support so that
their legislation would pass.
One of the key compromises involved the soft or "dirty" coal industry. 38
Environmentalists in Congress were willing to exchange lower levels of envi-
ronmental protection than could be obtained for a given cost by compliance
in exchange for sufficient support to pass the 1977 amendments. They did so
by requiring that power plants burning coal install expensive scrubbers to
remove sulfur in coal regardless of whether they used coal high in sulfur.39
Imposing a performance standard instead of a technological constraint
would have allowed utilities to choose the least-cost method, i.e., to choose
between high-sulfur coal along with scrubbers and low-sulfur coal without
scrubbers. 40 Under a performance standard, many utilities would have
switched to low-sulfur coal. The technological standard, in contrast, ad-
vantaged the high-sulfur coal regions by requiring all utilities to install scrub-
bers, thus preventing utilities from using the least-cost method to meet the
standards. As Ackerman and Hassler conclude, the scrubber requirement
greatly increased the total costs of meeting the standard.4' At the same time,
because this provision greatly benefitted the older, unionized coal regions of
35. An important exception to this general rule occurs when authors can be held accountable for
their words, such as when an author acts as floor manager for the legislation.
36. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
37. ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 34.
38. Id. at 35-41.
39. Id. at 14-15.
40. Id. at 17-18.
41. Id.
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the East such as Pennsylvania and West Virginia, The Clean Air Act Became
a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers.42 Environ-
mentalists in Congress were willing to support this provision because they
needed the support of the eastern coal regions to pass their Act. Support
from coal interests proved pivotal, forcing environmentalists to compromise
their vision of a clean environment in exchange for a bill. Moreover, had the
parties expected that courts would later reject the scrubber requirement in
favor of a more pro-environmental performance standard, no legislation
would have occurred.
This pattern of compromise is a common one and illustrates our point that
the need to gain support of pivotal players typically requires that the ardent
supporters compromise their goals and their pure vision of the legislation.
43
B. COMPETITION FOR THE TITLE OF "MR. ENVIRONMENTALISM"
Conventional wisdom among legal scholars and political scientists holds
that the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act resulted from a competition
between President Nixon and Senator Muskie for the role of the national
champion of environmental legislation." This competition induced a form
of "policy escalation" in which Nixon and Muskie sought to offer ever more
stringent provisions in their proposed legislation in an effort to outdo the
other. According to this view, this competition accounts for the contents of
the Clean Air Act.
For present purposes, we stipulate that policy escalation occurred and ask
how this should affect statutory interpretation. 45 To answer this question,
42. Id (subtitle).
43. Other examples of compromise in the legislative process abound. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE &
FRICKEY, supra note 1, at 22-23 (discussing compromises in the Civil Rights Act of 1964); John
Ferejohn, Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation, in CON-
GRESS AND POLICY CHANGES 223, 227-31 (Gerald C. Wright et al. eds., 1986) (discussing the
inception of the food stamp program); Thomas Gilligan et al., Regulation and the Theory of Legisla-
tive Choice, 32 J.L. & ECON. 35, 50-53 (1989) (discussing the creation of the first federal regulatory
agency by the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act); McCubbins et al., supra note 19, at 22-23 (discussing
compromises in OSHA and CPSA legislation); McCubbins & Page, supra note 19, at 412-23 (dis-
cussing compromises in Toxic Substances Control Act); Moe, supra note 19, at 289-306 (discussing
compromises in OSHA legislation); Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 14, at 2-4 (same).
44. E-g., JONES, supra note 34, at 175-210; Elliott et al., supra note 34, at 335-37.
45. An alternative explanation for the escalation is that, over the course of the legislative debate,
support for environmental legislation grew among the public and in Congress. Muskie's first bill
was introduced in late 1969, followed in February by the introduction of the President's version into
the House. The House bill was passed in June of 1970, though the Senate did not begin its floor
debate until September. The conference opened in early October, and the compromise bill passed in
December. JONES, supra note 34, at 175-210.
The conference outcome provides a strong piece of evidence favoring this alternative explanation.
The final bill looked much like the Senate version. If the House and its committee had, at the time
of the conference, wanted a weaker bill such as the one they passed in June, why did they accept the
Senate's version? As holder of a veto gate, nothing prevented them from holding out for conces-
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we must address what policy escalation implies for the ultimate legislative
bargain. The policy escalation between Nixon and Muskie over their initial
proposals can be represented simply as follows. In Figure 2, Case 1, the
status quo, Q, represents a low level of environmental protection. The me-
dian member of the Senate, M, has an ideal well above this and thus prefers
significantly more environmental protection than Q. The policy alternative,Q+, represents the maximum level of environmental protection that the me-
dian prefers to Q.
FIGURE 2
Case 1
Q M Q+ P Mu
--p-
Q M Q+ P Mu P* Mu*
Nixon and Muskie are represented as relatively high in the distribution of
preferences. According to this view, their competition for the title of "Mr.
Environmentalism" led them to advocate levels of protection higher than the
ideal levels of most voters and their representatives in Congress. President
Nixon is represented at P, Senator Muskie at Mu. The policy escalation that
followed from their competition is reflected in the advocacy of increasingly
stronger policies. First Nixon leapfrogged Muskie from P to P* (Figure 2,
Case 2). Muskie then reacted by leapfrogging Nixon from Mu to Mu *.
The point of this illustration is twofold. First, while this competition
might have led Nixon and Muskie to advocate increasingly greater levels of
protection, and while they may have been the most central figures in actually
writing provisions, this does not imply that their views of the legislation were
determinative. The reason is that, by virtue of their competition to be identi-
fied with a relatively extreme position, neither would prove pivotal in the
decision to pass legislation. Regardless of their competition, the median
voter in this example remains at M, and would not support a policy beyond
Q+. Put another way, policy competition by ardent supporters does not im-
ply that the final legislation itself is any different.
sions. The fact that they acceded suggests that, six months after passage of their own version, they
wanted something stronger. Jones's view supports this interpretation: "Had air quality changed
enough to produce a crisis in September [1970] that was not apparent in March? Not really. What
had changed was decisionmakers' perceptions of public concern in this issue area." Id. at 176.
Case 2
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Perhaps scholars analyzing policy escalation would argue that competition
has important feedback effects on leading public opinion constituents to shift
their preferences toward greater levels of support for environmental protec-
tion. This, in turn, would cause M and Q+ to shift to the right. But that is a
separate argument and does not logically follow from the competition and
policy escalation.4 Because the pivotal voter-and not the ardent sup-
porter--determines the limits of the legislation, competition does not auto-
matically lead to a greater level of support in the final legislation.
The second point of the illustration concerns a subtle and implicit infer-
ence that sometimes enters the analysis of legislation when an ardent sup-
porter not only is the central champion of a piece of legislation but also
writes it. Under these circumstances, there is a tendency to assume that this
individual's views are determinative. Yet that conclusion fails to follow from
the observation that one individual wrote the legislation, for that individual
alone could not ensure the legislation's passage without obtaining the sup-
port of relevant committees, majorities in both chambers, and the President.
Even when a single, ardent supporter-and no one else-attends to produc-
ing the final, revised bill, the legislation must still gain the support of the
pivotal player. The need to gain this support implies that the legislation is
highly unlikely to embody the ideal of the ardent supporter and "author" of
the legislation.
The preceding analysis has two further implications. First, an ardent sup-
porter's statements during the debate are not a good guide for the purposes
of interpretation. Because an ardent supporter is rarely pivotal, that legisla-
tor's views, goals, and visions of the legislation are rarely representative of
the views, goals, and visions that will pass. This holds especially at the initial
legislative stages before important compromises have been struck. At this
time, the champion's expressions are likely to reflect personal preferences
and ideals. As it becomes known who will support the bill, who will oppose
it, and who is a potential swing or pivotal supporter, the bill evolves so as to
gain the pivotal player's support. As a result, the bill typically moves away
from the ardent supporter's view toward the pivotal player's view, and the
expressions and statements of understanding of the legislation by its floor
leaders changes to reflect the new understanding.
Second, moreover, the position of an ardent supporter is often highly am-
biguous, for an ardent supporter is likely to say different things at different
46. A range of alternative explanations for the same observations is possible. For instance, it
could well have been that the groundswell in support for environmental legislation was sufficiently
sudden that the preferences of the median voter in both Congress and the nation shifted rapidly
toward higher degrees of protection. Plausibly, Muskie and Nixon could have been tracking this
movement rather than being well out on the tail of the distribution. We put forth this argument not
because we think it is true, but because the alternative argument about policy escalation provides no
evidence against it or other interpretations.
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points in the debate. As an example, we quote from Donald Elliott, Bruce
Ackerman, and John Millian's classic account of the 1970 Clean Air Act
amendments:
Muskie wrote a "tough" pollution statute in 1970... only when he was
threatened with an outcome which was even worse from his perspective-
the loss of his reputation with the public as a crusader to clean up the
environment. 47
In a descriptive sense, this statement appears accurate. But for the purposes
of normative analysis, the case is not convincing. It is unclear that the policy
competition led to changes in what the median legislator would accept, and
hence to changes in the final bill. Our approach demonstrates that it is insuf-
ficient to show that an ardent supporter retained management over the writ-
ing of the act; politically sophisticated proponents still must carefully attend
the limits of what will pass. There is no obvious relationship between what
the ardent supporter wishes to see as legislation and what the pivotal players
will support. This view thus implies that we cannot rely on an author's ex-
pressed views on the subject of legislation to understand what the coalition
passing it intended.
C. SIERRA CLUB AND PSD
One key interpretative issue concerning the 1970 amendments was
whether the Act required the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) in
pristine areas. We have set out our view at length elsewhere48 and will only
summarize the logical errors that our approach suggests were made in Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus.49
The issue of PSD and its subsequent consideration in Sierra Club provide
an excellent illustration of our theoretical principles. The Clean Air Act's
preface provided unqualified, general support for environmental protection.
It stated that the legislation's purpose was to "protect and enhance the qual-
ity of the Nation's air resources." 50 On the other hand, the Act contained
numerous specific provisions that provided for control and constraints in
particular cases. For the case of PSD, the Act provided for national ambient
air quality standards, leaving it up to the states to decide whether to impose
stricter standards.51 While there was some discussion of significant deterio-
ration prior to the Act and some further discussion of it in the newly created
47. Elliott et al., supra note 34, at 338.
48. See McCubbins et al., supra note 23, at 445-46; see also MELNICK, supra note 34, at 71-80,
110-12 (yielding similar conclusions in analyzing the Clean Air Act).
49. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (1988).
51. MELNICK, supra note 34, at 71-79; McCubbins et al., supra note 23, at 450-59.
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during 1971, as Shep Melnick
observes:
In 1972, Administrator Ruckelshaus and his top advisers eliminated refer-
ences to "significant deterioration" not because they were under political
pressure to do so, but because the 1970 act provided the EPA with clear,
specific methods for deciding what constituted "acceptable" air pollution
increases. Unlike the 1967 act, the 1970 act required the EPA to set not
just primary or health-based standards, but secondary air quality standards
"requisite to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated ad-
verse effects associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambi-
ent air." Section 116 of the act confers upon the states, not the EPA,
authority to insist upon standards more stringent than these.
52
The Act thus contained an apparent contradiction. The preface clearly
stated that the Act's purpose was to "protect and enhance" air quality while
the section relating to deterioration allowed some deterioration in areas
above the national standards, though any potential deterioration became sub-
ject to stringent limitations (notably, best available control technology
(BACT) and the new source performance standard (NSPS)). Because of this
tension, at least two potential answers can be rationalized as consistent with
the statutory language as to the intent of the act. The broad, unqualified
language of the preface clearly indicates that any deterioration is inconsistent
with the Act. The specific provision of the Act, as noted above, indicates
that limited deterioration is allowed under certain circumstances.
In deciding this issue in Sierra Club, Judge Pratt of the District of Colum-
bia District Court concluded that the Act required PSD.53 Emphasizing the
language in the preface, he reasoned:
On its face, this language would appear to declare Congress' intent to im-
prove the quality of the nation's air and to prevent deterioration of that air
quality, no matter how presently pure that quality in some sections of the
country happens to be. 54
As both our earlier analysis and that of Melnick show, Judge Pratt chose
to ignore, downplay, or misinterpret the more specific provisions of the Act
allowing limited deterioration. For example, one of the five items Pratt used
to support his interpretation was a reference to a sentence in the 1970 report
of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. 55 The sentence
52. MELNICK, supra note 34, at 78-79 (emphasis added).
53. Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. at 256. As Melnick observes, the district court was the sole opin-
ion for this case. The circuit court accepted the lower court's decision without writing an opinion,
and the Supreme Court split four-to-four, thus "leaving the lower court's decision intact." MEL-
NICK, supra note 34, at 74.
54. Sierra Club, 344 F. Supp. at 255.
55. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970)).
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said that state implementation plans should be disapproved by the EPA if,
for clean areas, the plans did not "provide, to the maximum extent practica-
ble, for the continued maintenance of such ambient air quality." 56 As ob-
served in our earlier work,5 7 this language could be interpreted as requiring
PSD. However, the report went on to state:
Once such national goals are established, deterioration of air quality should
not be permitted except under circumstances where there is no available
alternative. Given the various alternative means of preventing and control-
ling air pollution-including the use of the best available control technol-
ogy, industrial processes, and operating practices-and care in the selection
of sites for new sources, land use planning and traffic controls--deteriora-
tion need not occur. 58
A more reasonable interpretation of the entire passage than Judge Pratt's is
that it did not intend to impose PSD. Instead, it sought a compromise be-
tween maintaining pristine areas at or above their current levels and allowing
them to deteriorate without control to the lower, national standards. It did
so by allowing some deterioration, but regulating the latter by imposing
BACT and NSPS. 59
As we emphasized above, legislation is typically the product of a coalition
with disparate views of an issue and the role of the legislation. 6° Moreover,
different provisions are often written at the behest of different members of the
coalition. The ardent supporters wrote the preface of the Act, stating a
broad, unqualified purpose. And yet the specific provisions, as illustrated by
the controversy over PSD, were often more complex and did not unambigu-
ously provide for the maximum amount of protection for air quality. The
inconsistencies in the Act arose because other supporters, notably those rep-
resenting pristine areas, wanted some flexibility in the Act so it would not
inhibit economic growth in their areas. There representatives were willing to
accept BACT and NSPS, but not PSD, and PSD was not required by the
Act. Judge Pratt clearly changed the meaning of the Act with respect to
PSD by ignoring the specific provisions and relying on the broader, unquali-
fied preface to address the obvious contradiction. In so doing, he altered the
56. S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 55, at 11.
57. McCubbins et al., supra note 23, at 450-54.
58. Id at 451 (emphasis added).
59. Melnick comes to the same conclusions, noting that this interpretation underlay
Ruckleshaus's 1972 decision. "The EPA's lawyers advised Administrator Ruckleshaus that secon-
dary air quality standards and NSPSs defined permissible 'deterioration,' and that the EPA had no
legal authority to establish additional restrictions." MELNICK, supra note 34, at 79. Moreover,
Judge Pratt failed to explain why, if the legislation intended this to mean PSD, it did not simply
specify PSD. This is especially odd since he asserted that it implied PSD because earlier officials at
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare had proposed it. Sierra Club. 344 F. Supp. at
255.
60. See supra Part II.n.
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provision from one supported by pivotal legislators to one preferred by ar-
dent supporters. By choosing to ignore a specific qualification, he misread
the intention of the coalition supporting the Act.
In this sense Sierra Club might be termed an "expansive judicial reading"
of legislation. Such readings are always possible when courts can rationalize
more than one interpretation based on different portions of the statutory text.
One of the advantages of our view is that it provides a means for addressing
these ambiguities rather than leaving it up to the preferences or discretion of
the courts. In this case, the relevant positive canon is that, whenever the
specific language of a given provision conflicts with the broad purposes of the
preface or preamble of an act, ambiguities should be resolved in favor of
interpretations consistent with the specific rather than the more general pro-
visions. In terms of our approach, Judge Pratt violated the canons of our
theory.
The aftermath of Sierra Club provided one last insight about the norma-
tive implications of statutory interpretation that endures. Melnick argues
that while PSD was not the policy intended by the 1970 Act, "[b]oth the
EPA and Congress later decided that the courts were right," and that "[t]he
1977 amendments ratified the core of the judicially developed policy. 61
Although the courts obviously changed PSD policy and Congress clearly was
unable to reverse this change in 1977, it does not follow that Congress de-
cided that the courts were "right" in the sense that PSD was a better policy.
As positive political theory models have shown since Brian Marks's pioneer-
ing paper, inaction does not imply acquiescence. 62 When the preferences of
the politicians who possess veto power differ significantly, courts can alter
interpretation toward one and away from the other with impunity. Because
any such change advantages one, legislation that attempted to reestablish the
original agreement would be vetoed. This circumstance is, thus, better seen
as a form of ex post opportunism than as legislative acceptance. Indeed,
Melnick recognizes this logic, for he argues that
a major reason the courts won political vindication was that they shifted
the balance of power between Congress and the president. On both PSD
and dispersion the president and his top advisers disagreed with the courts,
while the key congressional committees supported the courts' policies. The
court decisions allowed the EPA to ignore the White House. They also
allowed the House and Senate committees to achieve their preferred poli-
cies merely by blocking White House proposals to reverse the court
decisions. 6 3
As Melnick makes clear, the courts here won a political battle in the sense
61. MELNICK, supra note 34, at 72 (emphasis added).
62. See generally Marks, supra note 23.
63. MELNICK, supra note 34, at 72.
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that their change advantaged one subset of coalition partners. The latter
cannot be expected to give up their court-won gains by reinstating the status
quo. From a normative standpoint, this form of political inaction fundamen-
tally differs from a ratification by inaction in which actors at every veto gate
prefer the court ruling to the status quo.
Our analysis thus yields another insight about statutory interpretation:
the absence of an ex post reaction to a judicially imposed policy does not
imply acceptance of the judicial interpretation of the original legislation.
Rather, it reflects a court's ability to replace the original intent with its own
preferences under political circumstances in which elected officials cannot
reverse a court decision.
CONCLUSIONS
Positive political theory can make a significant contribution to the positive
and normative theory of statutory interpretation. Positive theory focuses at-
tention on several important features of the legislative process. One feature
is a sharper conceptualization of the notion of "statutory intent." According
to the view taken in this article, the intent of a statute is to codify the agree-
ment of the enacting coalition with respect to the policy adopted, in part so
that members of the enacting coalition can know more precisely the nature of
their agreement, and in part to convey instructions to agencies and courts.
Statutes are most assuredly not embodiments of the intent of any particular
legislator, but a compromise among these intents. The structure and process
of legislative enactment allocate influence to the relevant actors (including
the President), and sometimes accord greater weight to one over another-
depending on the specific circumstances surrounding the legislation. Conse-
quently, there does not exist a set of weights to be attached to the preferences
of members of the enacting coalition that applies in all cases. Nor should
equal weight be placed on elements of the legislative history, regardless of
how the legislation actually evolved.
Positive political theory provides a method for separating elements of the
legislative process that are likely to reveal relevant information about the
agreement of the enacting coalition from elements that are susceptible to op-
portunistic manipulation by individual coalition members to seek personal
advantage in the way statutes are interpreted. The first canon of evaluating
legislative history should be that consequential actions have priority over in-
consequential ones. The second canon, following from the first, is that deci-
sions by legislators to reject language provide useful negative inferences
about statutes. The third canon is that the totality of the legislative history
conveys important information about whose preferences were most conse-
quential in shaping the coalitional agreement. That is, in the sequence of
veto points through which a statute must pass, some are likely to be much
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closer calls than others, and it is at these stages where the details of the
coalitional agreement are most profoundly shaped. The fourth canon is that,
because both statutes and the Constitution give a role to the President in the
legislative process, statutory interpretation must take the President's prefer-
ences into account and must accord them considerable weight if the Presi-
dent possessed a credible veto threat over the statute in question.
Our view also has important implications for current controversies in stat-
utory interpretation. One is the concept of deference to agencies. According
to this view, agency interpretation should be accorded primary weight when
legislation is ambiguous or contradictory. The problem that is created by
granting deference to agencies is that it implicitly reassigns weight to prefer-
ences among members of the legislative coalition that does not necessarily
reflect their influence in legislation. Specifically, day-to-day oversight of
agency decisions is managed primarily by the President, and within Congress
the oversight process in subcommittees is the primary means of conveying
the legislators' preferences to the bureaucracy. On matters about which the
President has strong views, the President's position as Chief Executive will
naturally lead agencies to favor the preferences of the President. If, when
legislation was developed, the President's preferences were not pivotal, the
effect is to unravel the original legislative agreement. Knowing this, if the
judiciary adopts a policy of deference to agencies, Congress will be less will-
ing to pass legislation because it will not be able to rely on the courts to carry
out the compromises it makes with the President. Likewise, if a matter is less
important to the President, the details of legislative implementation are likely
to be more heavily influenced by subcommittee oversight. Because subcom-
mittees are often populated by ardent supporters of policies, the effect of def-
erence in this case is to disenfranchise the moderates who, in the legislative
process, were unwilling to go along with the visions of the ardent supporters.
Deference to agencies can plausibly be defended only when an agency's
overseers in the White House or Congress can be regarded as the pivotal
members of the enacting coalition. To ascertain that this is the case, how-
ever, requires precisely the positive political theory analysis recommended in
this paper. Deference to the agency is justified only if the agency is attempt-
ing to implement the preferences of pivotal members. Hence, the concept
carries no additional normative value beyond the positive political theory
analysis that is necessary to sustain it.
Positive political theory also has substantial implications with respect to
the debate over textualism. 64 Textualist judges view as arbitrary many read-
ings of statutes in previous court decisions, in part because the latter rely on
legislative history to support interpretations textualists consider "expansion-
64. This discussion draws from Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 14.
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ary." Textualist judges hope to use their new strategy as a means of rational-
izing a retreat from expansive judicial readings. While many criticize
textualism because of its policy consequences and its association with con-
servative judges, textualism is more than simply a strategy for implementing
a different judicial ideology. Wholly apart from any policy motives, it is a
strategy aimed at an important problem, the potential for arbitrary use of
legislative history by courts.65 As we argue above, the absence of a theory of
the legislative process implies that the ability of judges to reinterpret legisla-
tion has few limits. Textualism directly addresses the problem of arbitrari-
ness, for it denies the courts the use of the very indicia used by the previous
courts to rationalize the expanded readings. For this reason textualism must
be taken more seriously than it is by those who wish to dismiss it because of
its present policy implications.
From our perspective, textualism is a blunt and unsatisfactory instrument
for mitigating the problem of arbitrariness because it denies to the courts the
use of the material needed to interpret a statutory agreement in circum-
stances that were not provided for in the original act. The absence of an
explicit provision does not mean that the act fails to apply, for the circum-
stance may be a new one which affords either of two interpretations, depend-
ing upon how one reads the act. Because it denies courts a vital source of
evidence and information, textualism's prohibition on the use of legislative
history makes it less likely that the courts will choose the interpretation that
would have been chosen by the act's enacting coalition. For these reasons, a
set of positive canons grounded in legislative theory is a superior alternative
to textualism. As in contract law, positive canons reduce the potential for
arbitrariness and allow courts to play a valuable role in interpreting statutes
by relying on indicia to gain evidence of a statute's meaning.
Of course, textualists might counter by criticizing our use of contract law
as an inappropriate analogy. The reason is that the normative case support-
ing efficient contracting seems stronger than that supporting efficient legisla-
tive exchange. One reason is that the theoretical foundation for the concept
of legislative efficiency-positive political theory-is less well understood by
legal scholars and judges than are the basic principles of economics that un-
derlie contract law. Consequently, the notion of efficient legislative exchange
appears more nebulous. In addition, problems of interest group influence,
rent-seeking, 66 and the pursuit of private gain at the public expense may be
65. Of course, proponents of "dynamic statutory interpretation" also recognize the potential ar-
bitrary use of indicia, though they propose a different solution. See, e.g., FARBER AND FRICKEY,
supra note 3, at 102-106; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1533-38 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 408, 441-43 (1989).
66. The coercive power of the state can be used to alter markets for private gain, that is, to create
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interpreted as causing important differences between market exchange and
legislative exchange. Indeed, much of positive political theory has addressed
this difference. 67 Yet, the difference is less one of kind than of quantitative
magnitude, for third-party effects or economic externalities are an explicit
part of the law governing market transactions. In any case, while we agree
that public law must take important political failures into account, textual-
ism appears an inadequate way to address them. If legislatures produce not
only public-regarding laws, but private-regarding ones, that problem should
be addressed directly via a set of canons whose purpose is to make that type
of legislation less likely.68 The problem with textualism is that it inhibits and
devalues legislation indiscriminately. Not only does it inhibit legislation
favoring private interests at the public expense, but it also makes public-re-
garding legislation less likely.
Our brief analysis of the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act illustrates
our principles at work. It reveals how legislation is the product of a diverse
group of legislators with different interests. While the views of the ardent
supporters of the legislation might be the easiest and clearest for outsiders-
legal scholars, political scientists, and judges-to understand ex post, their
views are rarely determinative because they rarely have sufficient strength to
comprise a majority. As a result, legislation usually requires a compromise
between ardent advocates and more moderate supporters of the legislation.
Often the form of the compromise is that some provisions are added to the
bill and others subtracted, in many cases during the floor debate. Commonly
legislators do not then go back to other sections of the bill to make all the
wording completely consistent, in part because legislation frequently runs
hundreds of pages. Consequently, the legislative bargaining process can in-
troduce tensions into the legislation as some portions pursue the basic goal in
an uncompromised fashion while others are more qualified, circumspect, or
limited.
Most regulatory legislation contains conflicts between a broad, public-re-
garding, and unqualified mandate and implementing sections that introduce
qualifications. 69 The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act were of this
"rents." Rent-seeking refers both to these rents and to the nexus of activities associated with ob-
taining them.
67. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 3, at 116-43 (exploring the relevance of public choice to
statutory interpretation).
68. Indeed, a lively literature has arisen on precisely this topic. See generally Jonathan Macey,
Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group
Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986); Sunstein, supra note 65; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Prefer-
ences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984).
69. As Shapiro observes, most new health, safety, and environmental statutes in the United
States:
typically contain high aspirational general language that appears to demand the achieve-
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form. Qualifications arise through the process of compromise in which the
ardent supporters write the basic framework for the legislation, including the
widely quoted rhetoric placed at the beginning of the act, while many of the
specific provisions are written at the behest of those who insist upon qualifi-
cations in order to support the legislation. Because ardent supporters typi-
cally embrace qualifying language only when doing so is necessary to pass
the legislation, the moderates supporting the qualifications are pivotal, and,
hence, their preferences should be given greater weight in statutory
interpretation.
Judge Pratt ruled in Sierra Club that the broad mandate in the preface of
the 1970 Act held precedence because no one who truly supported such a
purpose would have allowed deterioration of pristine areas.70 While his in-
ternal logic holds given its explicit premise-no one who agreed with the
unqualified view stated in the preface would allow deterioration-the implied
premise that all who supported the legislation also supported the preface is
false. Our approach to the development of positive canons emphasizes that
provisions required to gain the support of pivotal members should be deter-
minative. When their provisions conflict with the language of the nonpivotal
supporters, the views of the pivots, necessary to pass the legislation, should
take precedence. For the 1970 amendments, this implies taking seriously the
qualification to the overall goal for clean areas stated in the preface.
Notice also that Sierra Club provides two examples of a point made by
textualists, namely that judges sometimes use expansionary readings of legis-
lation to make new policy. First, PSD was not intended by the members of
the coalition supporting the legislation. Second, PSD was not the policy in
effect at the time of the case because the EPA under William D. Ruckelshaus
had decided against it. Yet, in the challenge to PSD embodied in Sierra
Club, a textualist could not arrive at a conclusion to eliminate the require-
ment for PSD simply by invalidating the use of legislative indicia.71 To reach
this conclusion courts need a coherent method for deciding between conflict-
ing parts of the text and in particular, a rationale for emphasizing the quali-
fied provisions over the unqualified statement of purpose. Some textualist
judges might be willing to rationalize such a reading solely on the basis of
their preferences or ideology. But that is simply replacing one arbitrary rule
ment of an absolutely healthy, safe, and beautiful working and living environment with no
consideration at all of costs. More deeply buried in the same statutes are vague language,
exceptions and fudges of myriad sorts that allow some balancing of benefits and costs and
some amelioration of impacts.
Martin Shapiro, The Court of Justice 35 (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The
Georgetown Law Journal).
70. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253, 256 (D.D.C. 1972).
71. Because the 1977 amendments provide for PSD explicitly in the legislative text, a textualist
would uphold the policy after that date. See 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (1988).
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with another. Our approach instead underscores the value of a theory of the
legislative process, for it provides a set of objective, non-ideological criteria to
help make this decision.72
Whereas the implications of positive political theory are substantial and
not entirely obvious, the potential contribution of positive theory to the prob-
lem of statutory interpretation is far from fully realized. This paper contains
some examples and illustrations; it by no means constitutes anything ap-
proaching a full-blown theory of statutory interpretation. To do so would
require a far more general and realistic characterization of the legislative pro-
cess than the simplified one presented here. Some of the most important
unanswered questions are as follows.
First, what happens with a multidimensional issue? A single, pivotal
group of moderates typically does not exist in this case. However, a coalition
must form to create a majority, and it usually does so by trading support over
various provisions among groups of legislators. Although we have not ex-
tended our approach to cover this case, the necessary modifications are not
difficult to identify.
Second, often floor managers, even though ardent supporters of an unqual-
ified vision, act as an honest agent of the enacting coalition and accurately
express the view of the compromise version. Consequently the same individ-
ual (e.g., Senator Muskie in the case of 1970's environmental legislation) may
act in different capacities at different points in the legislative process-in the
initial subcommittee markup secessions, during the bill's floor consideration,
and finally when the conference version comes to the floor. When a leader
decides to act as an advocate, moderates may speak up to emphasize the
qualifications necessary to gain their support. Additionally, members who
have not succeeded in obtaining the language they seek may speak out during
the floor debate to try to affect the legislative history in order to win the day
when the court reviews the statute. A general theory of legislation needs to
address more completely how to separate cheap talk from accurate represen-
tation of the compromise.
Third, the role of interest groups in public policy formation has not been
taken into account in our analysis. In recent years, legal scholars have de-
bated the role and legitimacy of lobbyists, notably as they relate to statutory
interpretation. Several scholars have discussed the possibility that statutes
representing private deals among interests should be given a more "public-
regarding" interpretation. 73 This important set of issues deserves considera-
ble attention. Because our analysis has ignored this problem, qualifications
72. In the case we have examined, the answer appears to be one that a conservative textualist
would desire, but not because the two are logically tied. In other circumstances the result would
differ.
73. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 1; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 3, at 399-419;
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to our positive canons may be necessary. Presumably these qualifications
would take the form of a set of canons that prescribe how to identify undesir-
able influence by interest groups and when legislative intent regarding these
provisions should be set aside. We emphasize, however, that though this
may result in qualifications to the canons presented here, it will not rational-
ize setting aside our program for interpretation. A necessary condition to set
aside a provision on the grounds that it benefits a private interest is that
legislative intent, as defined above, be determined. Only then can there be
proper assurance that its meaning was to provide an illegitimate private ben-
efit instead of another, otherwise unnoticed purpose.
More broadly, the pathologies of democracy that the U.S. governmental
system is supposed to protect against include more than the instability and
manipulability of legislative actions in Congress. They also include protec-
tions against the use of the coercive power of the state by one group to op-
press another, and the possibility that majorities can behave irrationally in
the short run owing to unusual and explosive circumstances. Expansive, du-
rable legislation is less appealing when it arises from either circumstance.
How one thinks about the tradeoffs between statutory efficiency from the
perspective of the enacting coalition versus protections against these patholo-
gies of democracy must play an important part of a normative theory of
statutory interpretation.
Macey, supra note 68, at 132-39; Sunstien, supra note 65, at 446-51; Sunstein, supra note 68, at
1727-32.
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